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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of a social choice
rule to implement a social policy for ìsecuring basic well-being for all.î The
paper introduces a new scheme of social choice, called a social relation function (SRF), which associates a reáexive and transitive binary relation over
a set of social policies to each proÖle of individual well-being appraisals and
each proÖle of group evaluations. As part of the domains of SRFs, the
available class of group evaluations is constrained by three conditions. Furthermore, the non-negative response (NR) and the weak Pareto condition
(WP) are introduced. NR demands giving priority to group evaluation,
while treating the groups as formally equal relative to each other. WP requires treating impartially the well-being appraisals of all individuals. In
conclusion, this paper shows that under some reasonable assumptions, there
exists an SRF that satisÖes NR and WP.
JEL: D63.
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Introduction

Despite the United Nationsí declaration of universal human rights in 1948,
persons with disabilities have long been restricted in their e§ective exercise
of these rights. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
which was adopted by the United Nations in 2006, has brought about new insights on human rights as well as democracy. The convention is innovative in
that it requires the e§ective exercise of human rights for persons with disabilities by, for example, removing discriminatory practices that have built up
over time and implementing ìreasonable accommodationsî in public places.1
Further, a remarkable aspect of drafting this convention is that, persons with
disabilities have taken the initiative and o§ered their expertise in assessing
alternative articles, going by the slogan ìNothing about us, without us.î
The above example urges us to reconsider the appropriateness of the standard framework of social choice theory, as there is little discussion about the
relationship between asymmetrical prior treatments of individual preferences
and the di§erent types of social choice problems they are admissible in. In
addition, it indicates that the asymmetrical prior treatment of individual
preferences could be appropriate when the given social choice problem is on
the e§ective exercise of universal human rights with respect to the particularity of those individuals. The main purpose of this paper is to formulate
a social choice procedure that permits prior treatments for disadvantaged
groups not as exceptions but as a general rule under some reasonable and
socially imposed conditions. More speciÖcally, we focus on a speciÖc type
of social choice problem: selecting a public policy in terms of securing basic
well-being for all and deÖning the concept of a ìgroupî as a representation
of particularity that requires a prior treatment in order to secure basic wellbeing for all.
The framework of this paper is as follows. First, the key concept of this
paper, an individualís ìwell-being,î2 is deÖned as a function of individualsí
abilities and social policies (called well-being transformations). While no
particular type of a well-being indicator is presumed, it is generically multidimensional in the space of plural attributes,3 each of which is observable in
public. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, individualsí
1

See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 2).
The concept of ìfunctionings vectorî or ìcapabilityî a la Amartya Sen are typical
examples of the well-being indicator (Sen, 1980, 1985).
3
For a detailed discussion of evaluative attributes, see Pattanaik and Xu (2007, 2012).
2
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well-being transformations are assumed to be Öxed and the proÖle of each
individual well-being is identiÖed corresponding to each alternative social
policy. The paper also refers to ìbasic well-being,î which represents a critical
reference point of multi-dimensional well-beings that one can legitimately
claim to have met by social policies, and each group can refer to it to identify
the ìinjusticeî of social policies.4
Second, a social choice rule to select a social policy for securing basic
well-being for all is introduced and examined. This social choice rule, which
we call a social relation function (SRF), is deÖned as having three elements
as its informational basis: the individual appraisal of well-being contents,
the group appraisal of well-being contents, and the group evaluation of social
policies. The individual appraisal is formulated as a binary relation deÖned
over the universal class of well-being contents; the group appraisal is formulated as the intersection of its membersí appraisals; and the group evaluation
is formulated as a binary relation deÖned over social policies, focusing on its
least advantaged members who are identiÖed on the basis of the group appraisal. By using the three elements of information, an SRF forms a social
evaluation, which is a binary relation deÖned over social alternatives.
Some remarks on the SRF framework are necessary. First, the individual
appraisal of well-being contents is based on her own conception of the good,
while the group appraisal of well-being contents is based on the conception
shared by the members. In contrast, the group evaluation of social policies
is supposed to correspond to conceptions of justice shared in the society,
which are embodied explicitly by the axioms and conditions and implicitly
by public reasoning. Thus, throughout this paper, ìbetter or worseî is used
in the comparative evaluation of well-being contents, while ìmore or less
justî or ìless or more unjustî is used in the comparative evaluation of social
policies.5
Second, because of the multiplicity of attributes for well-being, the types
of disadvantages may be diversiÖed, which could generate di§erent types
of ìthe least advantaged.î Although they share the common feature that
Also see Fleurbaey (2007) and Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004) for a discussion of wellbeing indicators.
4
For instance, if the well-being indicator is speciÖed by ìcapability,î basic well-being
implies ìbasic capabilityî (Sen, 1980, p. 367).
5
This usage is derived from the distinction of concepts of ìthe goodî and of ìjusticeî
according to Rawls (Rawls, 1971, pp. 396-397), while ìless or more unjustî is derived
from Sen, as mentioned in section 4.
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they lack access to basic well-being, as illustrated in section 2, the concrete
contents (the lists, scales, and sizes) of basic well-being might di§er from each
other, depending upon the types of disadvantages and their corresponding
conceptions of justice.6 Therefore, in this paper, the concept of ìgroupî is
operationally deÖned as a maximum unit that can commonly share a concrete
content of basic well-being and can identify ìthe least advantagedî within
the group.
Third, due to the multi-dimensionality of well-being contents, the individual and group appraisals could be incomplete,7 which implies that intrapersonal full comparability of these appraisals cannot be generally presumed,
while inter-personal comparability of these appraisals can be legitimately presumed to some extent at least in a group.
Due to the three-component structure of the informational basis, SRFs
allow the appropriate asymmetric and prior treatment of speciÖc groups of
individuals relevant to the underlying social choice problem in question as
well as the symmetric treatment of individual appraisals. To incorporate
this idea formally, we introduce two basic axioms, the non-negative response
(NR) and the weak Pareto (WP) axioms for SRFs within this framework.
NR requires that SRFs should give priority to a disadvantaged groupís evaluation whenever any other groupsí evaluations are not completely opposite
to this groupís, while WP requires that SRFs should treat every individualís
appraisal symmetrically.
Given the possibility of a prior treatment of disadvantaged groups, we
introduce domain conditions of group evaluations to restrict groupsí ìdecisive powersî so as not to depart from the general societal goal. We name the
domain conditions the basic well-being condition, the restricted monotonicity, and the refrain condition. These conditions together stipulate that any
speciÖc disadvantaged group should evaluate social state x as ìmore justî
than social state y whenever (i) its least advantaged membersí well-being
contents under x (resp. y) are better or at least not worse (resp. not better
6

Our framework follows John Rawlsí di§erence principle in that securing basic wellbeing of the least advantaged respective to each policy is necessary and su¢cient for
achieving the social goal of securing basic well-being for all. Yet, although Rawlsí model
assumes inter-personal level-comparability for society as a whole, our model starts from
the possibility of di§erent types of ìthe least advantagedî derived from di§erent types of
disadvantages.
7
Note that the line of research on ranking opportunity sets initiated by Pattanaik and
Xu (1990) also does not presume completeness of binary relations over opportunity sets.
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or even worse) than under basic well-being; or (ii) its least advantaged membersí well-being contents are better under x than under y, given that their
respective well-being contents are worse under x and y respectively than under basic well-being. Moreover, this group should refrain from comparing x
and y whenever its least advantaged membersí well-being contents are better
under x and y respectively than under basic well-being.
An interesting question is to examine the general existence of an SRF
satisfying the three domain conditions as well as the two basic axioms. On
the one hand, such an existence problem may have some similarity to the
dominance and context-dependence paradox observed by Pattanaik and Xu
(2007; 2012). As a typical example of this kind of paradox, recall the Paretoliberal paradox initiated by Sen (1970), which points out the incompatibility
of minimal liberty and the Pareto principle, where the former is formulated
as the local decisiveness of some individuals, while the latter is formulated
as the global decisiveness of all individuals. Incidentally, in our framework,
the three conditions of group evaluations and NR together imply that a
disadvantaged group is given locally decisive power, in a weak sense,8 over
the speciÖc pairs of alternatives.
On the other hand, the existence issue of SRFs should not be argued
analogical to the original Pareto-liberal paradox. For, Örstly, the locally
decisive power of a disadvantaged group is much weaker than the standard
notion of local decisive power discussed in Arrow (1951/1963) and Sen (1970);
secondly, the least advantaged members of each group may vary owing to
the change of social policies, which makes it more complicated to identify
each group evaluation; and Önally, the domain of SRFs is not universal but
restricted by the three conditions. Moreover, among other things, the key
factor of this existence issue is the incompleteness of binary relations as the
informational basis of SRFs.9 In fact, our paper shows the extent to which
the incompleteness of group appraisals is acceptable so as not to rule out the
existence of SRFs that are compatible with NR and WP.
In the following discussion, Section 2 provides remarks on the concept of
ìgroupî with regard to the aim of securing basic well-being for all. Section
3 provides the basic SRF framework and section 4 the three conditions for
8

The intention of ìin a weak senseî here is that this groupís ëlocal decisivenessí over
such pairs is conditional on there being no resistance of any other groups.
9
Incompleteness of binary relations as the informational basis is not assumed in the
context of the Pareto-liberal paradox as well as other types of the dominance and contextdependence paradox discussed by Pattanaik and Xu (2012).

5

group evaluations and the relevant two axioms. Section 5 discusses the existence problem of SRFs satisfying these properties. Section 6 provides some
philosophical implications of this paper, and section 7 concludes the paper.

2

Group Characteristics: Di§erences in ìBasic Well-beingî and the Corresponding Conceptions of Justice

As mentioned in section 1, basic well-being represents a critical reference
point that one can legitimately claim to have met by social policies. Assuming
three types of disadvantages, this section illustrates the di§erences in the
contents of basic well-being and in their corresponding conceptions of justice.
The Örst type of disadvantage is closely related to what Aristotle called
ìcorrective justice.î It is based on recognizing the cause of the su§ered disadvantage as an injustice that needs to be redressed. Examples are disadvantages that derive from historical injustices such as colonial exploitation
and the ill-treatment of indigenous populations and victims of social diseases.
The corresponding conception of justice in contemporary context is, for example, Robert Nozickís discussion on historical injustice (Norzick, 1974).
The second type of disadvantage is related to the concept of ìjustice as
compensation.î This concept implies that individuals should be recognized
as disadvantaged if their vulnerability is due to the failure of social institutions to protect them from ìundeserved inequalities,î such as persons with
disabilities or certain diseases, or those discriminated on the basis of age,
nationality, gender, or being a single parent. This concept is supported by
the recent discussion on ìcompensation and responsibility.î10
The third type of disadvantage relates to the concept of ìjustice as protection.î This concept considers it unjust that some individuals have less
than what is necessary for a minimum standard of living.11 It focuses on
individuals, unlike the Örst two concepts, whose speciÖc causes of di¢culties
can be hard to identify. The corresponding conception of justice is the behind
idea of Rawlsís di§erence principle, which takes a form of outcome equality
10

Refer to, for example, Fleurbaey, M. (1994) and Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet,
(2011)
11
For example, article 25 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates ìthe right to the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.î
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and requires bringing every individual up to a reference point (Rawls, 1993).
Because of this diversity of disadvantages and of the forms of justice underlying them, the concrete conception of basic well-being becomes plural.
Moreover, under a common concept of basic well-being, special needs must
be addressed relative to the di§erent types of disadvantages. To demonstrate
this, consider some examples of each disadvantage type. Individuals who have
su§ered historical injustice due to an atomic bomb, an event that completely
changed their life-goals, are a§ected by the Örst type of disadvantage. Many
have decided to live as witnesses of this social disaster in order to prevent
it from ever happening again at any other place or time. In such cases, air
tickets to áy to New York, which holds the ìNo more Hiroshima/Nagasaki
Congress,î or a grant for publishing their memoirs may be counted as a necessity for securing their basic well-being. Similarly, with respect to the second
type of disadvantage, fundamental freedoms should be promoted, protected,
and ensured for individuals with disabilities to function as active members of
society. For example, for individuals using the wheelchair, one of the essential
claims to secure basic well-being would be to remove environmental barriers
such as inaccessible buses or staircases. Finally, for individuals a§ected by
the third disadvantage type, such as the homeless, it is important to claim
basic needs including food, closing, shelter, and health care to protect their
right to the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living as a means
to secure basic well-being.
Lastly, it should be noted that an individual might actually su§er from
all three types of disadvantages mentioned above and as a result will be
included in each of the three groups. This implies that such an individualís
basic well-being consists of three aspects that cannot be compared intrapersonally, while each of the three aspects permits inter-personal comparison
within each group. In this case, the individual can participate in the process
of making an evaluation of each group, also deserving to take advantage of
social policies addressing all three types of disadvantages, although the actual
amount of provision might be reduced considering combination e§ects of the
three policies.

3

The Basic Model

Consider a society with population N = f1; 2; :::; i; :::; ng, where 2 & n <
+1. Let us denote a social state by x, and the set of all possible social
7

states by X, where 3 & #X < +1. Each x 2 X may be interpreted
as representing an admissible social policy. Thus, we sometimes call each
x 2 X a social policy x. Note that a social policy x does not necessarily
represent a single policy. For instance, it may present a bundle of multiple
social policies or a state of resource allocation realized by a certain bundle
of social policies.
For each i 2 N , let Zi be a product of subsets of metric spaces, which
represents the set of conceivable well-being contents for i. Let Z ) [i2N Zi .
For each i 2 N , let iís well-being transformation be a mapping Ci : X !
Zi such that for each x 2 X, Ci (x) is a vector in Zi .12 Ci represents an
individualís ability to transform each social policy to a content of well-being
and Ci (x) represents individual iís well-being available under the social policy
x . Let C ) (Ci )i2N be a proÖle of the well-being transformations. Denote
the admissible set of proÖles of well-being transformations by C.
Given Z , for each i 2 N , let us deÖne a binary relation %i on Z , which
is reáexive and transitive. We call this %i a well-being appraisal of i. The
interpretation of the well-being appraisal %i is that, for any C; C 0 2 Z ,
C %i C 0 if and only if C is at least as good as C 0 for i. Given %i deÖned on
Z , let C -i C 0 if and only if C %i C 0 holds but C 0 %i C does not hold; let
C .i C 0 if and only if C %i C 0 and C 0 %i C hold. If Z is a partially ordered
set endowed with a partial ordering / on Z ,13 it may be assumed that for
any i 2 N and any C; C 0 2 Z , if C / C 0 , then C %i C 0 , and if C > C 0 ,
then C -i C 0 . The well-being appraisal %i reáects a bundle of criteria for
comparing iís well-being contents.
Next, let us deÖne the concept of group. Given society N , there exists a
set of characteristics T with generic element t such that (1) 0 < #T 5 #N ;
and (2) for each C 2 C and each t 2 T , there exists a unique subset NCt of N .
12

Although Ci (x) is formulated as a vector in Zi , this formulation may allow an interpretation that Zi is a Hausdor§ topological space whose elements are all non-empty,
compact, and comprehensive subsets of Rm
+ , and each Ci (x) 2 Zi represents iís capability
(Sen, 1980; 1985) associated with the social policy x, as Herrero (1996) and Gotoh and
Yoshihara (2003) did. Basu and Lopez-Calva (2011) provide an illuminating survey on
the formulation of functionings and capabilities.
13
The precise deÖnitions of / and its asymmetric part > depend on the mathematical
structure of the space Z. For instance, if each C represents a vector on Z 0 Rm
+ , then
(/; >) represents the standard vector inequality. If each C represents a compact and
Rm
+ n?, then (/; >) represents the standard
comprehensive subset in Rm
+ , so that Z 0 2
0
set-inclusion as C / C if and only if for any z 2 C 0 , z 2 C holds; and C > C 0 if and only
if C / C 0 and C 0 # C.
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Note that NCt may be empty for some t 2 T , and NCt may be identical to N
for some t 2 T . Each element t 2 T is called a group. As argued in section 1,
each group t 2 T is assumed to be the maximal set of individuals who have a
certain disadvantage in common. In other words, each t represents a type of
conceivable disadvantage, and the set of group members NCt represents the set
of t-type disadvantaged individuals in society N with C. Thus, N n ([t2T NCt )
is the set of non-disadvantaged individuals in society N with C. As argued
in section 1, each group t 2 T is assumed to be a maximal set of individuals
who have a certain disadvantage in common

3.1
3.1.1

DeÖnition of Group Appraisals, Group Evaluations,
and Social Relation Functions
Group Appraisals

Again as argued in section 1, it is assumed that each group t is able to construct a criterion for comparing their well-being contents, which is commonly
shared by every member of this group, due to the similarity of disadvantages. Such a shared criterion for comparing well-being contents in group
t is formulated by the intersection of all membersí well-being appraisals,
%t ) \i2NCt %i , which is called hereafter a well-being appraisal of group t. To
represent a feature of the commonly shared criterion of all of its members,
%t is assumed to be non-empty for each t 2 T .14 Note that, since each %i is
reáective!and transitive, so" is the well-being appraisal of each group. Finally,
let % ) (%i )i2N ; (%t )t2T be a proÖle of well-being appraisals. Denote the
admissible set of proÖles of well-being appraisals by A.
3.1.2

The least advantaged in each group and the basic well-being

With the well-being appraisal of the group, the least advantaged within the
group can be deÖned as follows. Given society N with C 2 C and a proÖle
of well-being appraisals %2 A, the set of the least advantaged individuals of
type t under social policy x 2 X is deÖned by
#
$
LtC (x; %t ) ) i 2 NCt j @j 2 NCt : Ci (x) -t Cj (x) .
14

The idea behind this formulation is that each individual of each group appraises the
well-being contents of the members of the group, including her own, not in terms of a
personal conception of the good but in terms of a shared conception of the good, on the
basis of some commonality among members.
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That is, the least advantaged under social policy x is deÖned as an individual
whose well-being content never dominates the well-being contents of others.
Note that LtC (x; %t ) is non-empty for each x 2 X and for each t 2 T with
NCt 6= ?. Moreover, it is not necessarily a singleton.
While the set of the least advantaged individuals LtC (x; %t ) speciÖes the
relatively least position of individuals within the gruop, it does not refer to
their absolute well-being conditions. To refer to this point, the concept of
basic well-being BC t 2 Z , which is unique to each t 2 T , is introduced.
As argued in section 1, BC t is a reference well-being content that one can
legitimately claim to have met by social policies, and each group can refer to it
to identify the ìinjusticeî of social policies. In other words, the group should
concern about its membersí absolute well-being conditions in comarison with
the basic well-being BC t .
When making an appraisal of the well-being contents of the least advantaged members in comparison with the basic well-being, the group appraisal
should respect such membersí own appraisals of their own well-being contents in comparison with the basic well-being. That is, for any group t and
any individual i of the least advantaged members within the group t at the
social state x, this individualís appraisal %i should be respected in the group
appraisal %t at least over the comparison of her well-being Ci (x) under x
with the basic well-being BC t of the group. To ensure this property, the
following assumption is imposed on group appraisals:
For x 2 X, each t 2 T , and each i 2 LtC (x; %t ), if [BC t %i Ci (x)] (resp.
[Ci (x) %i BC t ]), then [BC t %t Ci (x)] (resp. [Ci (x) %t BC t ]) holds.
This assumption, combined with the deÖnition of %t , implies that the appraisal by the least advantaged individual of his/her own well-being condition
in comparison with the basic well-being is approved by all other members of
the same group, in that all of them do not reveal the opposite appraisal of
this individualís well-being in comparison with the basic well-being.
3.1.3

Group evaluations

While the group appraisal of each group is used to identify the least advantaged individuals among the group members, each group is also assumed to
evaluate alternative social policies in order to improve the well-being of the
least advantaged members. Such a scheme of evaluation is deÖned as a binary relation over the set of social policies X, which is formulated as follows.
10

Given society N with C 2 C and a proÖle of well-being appraisals %2 A, for
each t 2 T , the group evaluation of type t is deÖned as a reáexive relation
t
t
t
RC
on X, where let PCt be deÖned as the strict part of RC
. Likewise, let IC
t
t
be the indi§erent part of RC
. Moreover, let N RC
denote the non-comparable
t
t
t
t
part of RC ; that is, xN RC y if and only if neither xRC
y nor yRC
x. The
t
interpretation of RC is that it represents an evaluation of alternative social
policies, which is deÖned on the domain respective to this group, and which
can be agreed upon by all individuals in this group, NCt . Given society N
with C 2 C and a proÖle of well-being appraisals %2 A, let us denote the adt
missible class of such group evaluations of type t on X by DC
(%t ). Moreover,
t
T
t
let DC (%) ) 6t2T DC (%t ) and RC ) (RC )t2T .
3.1.4

Social relation functions

With this basic framework, we are ready to formally deÖne our scheme of
social choice rules as follows:
DeÖnition 1: Given a society N with a proÖle of well-being transformations
C 2 C, the social relation function (SRF) is the mapping F ;which associates
T
each well-being appraisal %2 A and each proÖle of group evaluations RC
2
DC (%) to the reáexive and transitive relation RC on X.
RC is called a social evaluation over X in a society with C 2 C.
By assuming that disadvantaged groups are given prior treatment in incorporating their information into a social policy, the two types of informational bases for disadvantaged groups, namely group appraisals and group
evaluations, may play di§erent functional roles. Group appraisals are necessary to identify the least advantaged members in each group on the basis of
its own conception of the good. Each group evaluation is formed on the basis
of its own group appraisal by focusing on the least advantaged members of
this group. The policy maker can choose appropriate social policies based on
the social evaluation derived from the SRF, into which she can incorporate
each individualís appraisal as well as each disadvantaged groupís evaluation.

11

4

Axioms for Group Evaluations and Social
Relation Functions

In this section, we deÖne several conditions assumed to be publicly imposed
on SRFs.

4.1

Axioms for Group Evaluations

A part of such conditions is to restrict the available class of group evaluations.
As argued in section 1, the group evaluation is introduced to evaluate alternative social policies in order to ensure that the well-being contents of the least
advantaged members of the group is not worse than the basic well-being. We
incorporate this idea as domain conditions of SRFs in this section.
Firstly, with the concept of basic well-being BC t 2 Z , for each t 2 T , let
the domain of group evaluations be classiÖed for each %2 A, each t 2 T and
each x; y 2 X as follows.
7 Case 6-1). Ci (x) %t BC t for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), and BCtt %t Cj (y) for
all j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case 6-2). Case 6-1) holds and moreover, Ci (x) -t BC t for all
i 2 LtC (x; %t ) or BC t -t Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case 7): Ci (x) %t BC t for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), and not [BC t %t Cj (y)] &
not [Cj (y) %t BC t ] for some j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case 9): not [BC t %t Ci (x)] & not [Ci (x) %t BC t ] for some i 2 LtC (x; %t ),
and BC t -t Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case :): BC t -t Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), and BC t -t Cj (y) for all
j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case ;): Ci (x) -t BC t for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ) ; and Cj (y) -t BC t for all
j 2 LtC (y; %t );
7 Case "): Otherwise.
12

That is, Case 6-1) refers to the domain where the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy x are all at least as good as basic well-being, while
the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy y are all at least as bad
as their basic well-being. Case 6-2) refers to the domain where 6-1) applies,
and the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy x are all better
than basic well-being, or the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy y are all worse than basic well-being. Case 7) refers to the domain where
the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy x are either all better
than basic well-being or all indi§erent to basic well-being, while at least one
of the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy y is non-comparable
with basic well-being. Case 9) refers to the domain where at least one of the
least advantaged individualsí well-beings in policy x is non-comparable with
their basic well-being, while the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in
policy y are all worse than their basic well-being. Case :) refers to the domain where the least advantaged individualsí well-beings are all worse than
their basic well-being in both policies x and y. Case ;) refers to the domain
where the least advantaged individualsí well-beings in both policies x and y
are all better than their basic well-being.
Based on this classiÖcation, let us introduce three conditions imposed on
group evaluations, which result in restricting the domain of the SRF F .
Basic Well-being Condition (BWC): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, and
t
each t 2 T , and for each x; y 2 X, xRC
y (resp. xPCt y) holds if (x; y)
corresponds to at least one of cases 6-1) (resp. 6-2), 7), and 9).
Restricted Monotonicity (RM): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, and each
t
t 2 T , and for each x; y 2 X, xRC
y (resp. xPCt y) holds if (x; y) corresponds to
case :), and Ci (x) %t Cj (y) (resp. Ci (x) -t Cj (y)) holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t )
and all j 2 LtC (y; %t ).
Refrain Condition (RC): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, and each t 2 T ,
t
and for each x; y 2 X with x 6= y, xN RC
y holds if (x; y) corresponds to
either case ;) or case ").
BWC requires each group to evaluate a social policy x , under which the
well-being contents of the least advantaged are at least as good as their basic
well-being, as being more just than another social policy y, under which the
well-being contents of the least advantaged either fall beneath their basic
well-being or cannot be compared with it. Furthermore, it requires each
13

group to evaluate a social policy y, under which the well-being contents of
the least advantaged fall beneath their basic well-being, as being less just
than another social policy x in which the well-being contents of the least
advantaged cannot be compared with their basic well-being.
RM requires each group to evaluate a social policy x as being more just
than another social policy y whenever the corresponding proÖle of the least
advantaged membersí well-beings is better in x than y, given that all of
their well-being contents derived from both policies fall beneath their basic
well-being. RM represents a kind of monotonicity criterion,15 although its
applicability is constrained to a proper domain of alternatives.
Lastly, RC requires a group evaluation not to make pair-wise rankings
of the social policies if the well-being contents of the least advantaged corresponding to these social policies are better than their basic well-being or
they cannot be compared with their basic well-being.16
Thus, the three conditions together deÖne the available class of group
evaluations, which make their rankings over pairs of social policies deserve
being called more or less unjust. The last comparative adjective is motivated
from the ìcomparative approach to justiceî proposed by Sen in place of a
ìtranscendental approach to justiceî (Sen 2009a, pp. 15-18, Sen, 2009b, p.
46f.). According to Sen, the latter is a traditional approach in ethics, which
focuses on the description of an ideal just state, while the former is a new
approach in ethics, which ranks alternative social states in terms of justice
but does not necessarily identify an ideal just state. The three conditions
constitute an attempt to formulate a ìcomparative approach to justice,î in
that they together make the available group evaluations consistent with the
common goal of securing basic well-being for all members of each group,
on the one hand by identifying ìunjustî policies as those fall short of basic
well-being and comparing them with one another to make evaluations of
them as ìless unjustî or ìmore unjust,îon the other hand by refraining from
identifying any of the policies as ideal just when they warrant everyoneís
15

The concept of dominance proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (2007, p. 361-362), which
is closely related to Senís idea of ìdominance partial orderingî (Sen, 1987, pp. 29-30) is a
good example.
16
This condition is similar to the ìfocus axiomî proposed by Sen (1981; p. 186), which
requests that the di§erence between two social states, both of which bring about capabilities at least as good as basic capability, is not reáected in the social evaluation. We are
grateful to James Foster and Prasanta Pattanaik for pointing this out. See Foster (1984;
p. 217) and Sen (1997; p. 172).
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well-being beyond basic well-being.
We examine the mutual consistency of these three conditions.
t
Lemma 1: Let the reáexive RC
satisfy BWC, RM, and RC. Then, it is
transitive.

Due to this lemma, each group can form its own evaluation based on the
three conditions that are rational in terms of logical consistency.

4.2

Axioms for Social Relation Functions

The next task for us is to introduce two basic axioms regarding how to
aggregate plural group evaluations as well as diverse individual well-being
appraisals in order to form a consistent social evaluation. To explore this
problem, let us introduce the following conditions.
T
Non-negative Response (NR): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, each RC
2
0
0
t0
DC (%), and each x; y 2 X, if there exists t 2 T such that xRC y (resp. xPCt y)
00
and there exists no t 00 2 T such that yPCt x, then xRC y (resp. xPC y) holds,
T
where RC = F (%; RC
).
T
Weak Pareto (WP): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, each RC
2 DC (%), and
each x; y 2 X, if Ci (x) -i Ci (y) holds for all i 2 N , then xPC y holds, where
T
RC = F (%; RC
).

Recall that each t 2 T represents a particular type of disadvantage, so
N n ([t2T NCt ) is the set of non-disadvantaged individuals in society N with
C. Hence, NR requires giving priority to the evaluations of disadvantaged
groups over the evaluations of non-disadvantaged individuals in the aggregation procedure, while there is no priority rule in the treatments of evaluations
among the di§erent disadvantaged groups. That is, even if the well-being
contents of all non-disadvantaged individuals become worse in y than in x ,
the social evaluation must be that y is at least as just as x whenever a group
t evaluates y as being at least as just as x and no other group evaluates x as
more just than y. Such a requirement seems quite reasonable whenever persons with a particular disadvantage can be considered as ìexpertsî on that
disadvantage and these persons are expected to provide a reasonable group
evaluation. In this respect, NR together with the available class of group
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evaluations constrained by BWC, RM, and RC warrant the reasonableness of preferential treatments of speciÖc types of groups in the aggregation
procedure.
In contrast, WP requires no prior treatment of any particular individualsí
appraisals. It simply states that, if the well-being contents of all individuals
are better in x than in y, then the social evaluation must be that x is more
just than y. In terms of respecting the plurality of the conceptions of the
good, WP also seems quite reasonable.
It is also worth mentioning that, although WP is a weaker condition
of welfarism, the requirement of NR with the scheme of group evaluations
makes SRFs non-welfaristic. To see this point, remember that the neutrality
property of social choice rules is necessary for welfarism in the standard
Arrovian framework.17 In our framework, neutrality of SRFs is deÖned as
follows: for any C 2 C, for every x; y; z; w 2 X, and for any two proÖles of
well-being appraisals %, %0 2 A, if [Ci (x) %i Ci (y) if and only if Ci (z) %0i
0
Ci (w)] holds for every i 2 N , then [xRC y if and only if zRC
w] holds, where
T
0
0
0T
RC = F (%; RC ) and RC = F (% ; RC ).
The following example shows that if SRFs satisÖes NR with the scheme
of group evaluations satisfying BWC, RM, and RC, then it does not satisfy
neutrality.
1

Example 1: Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g with C 2 C, T = ft1 ; t2 ; t3 g with NCt = f1g,
2
3
NCt = f2g, and NCt = f3g, and X = fx; y; z; wg. Let us deÖne two proÖles
of well-being appraisals %, %0 2 A as follows:
Ci (z) -

C2 (w) C4 (x) -

i

i

Ci (x) -i BC t -i Ci (w) -i Ci (y) for i 2 f1; 3g ;
2

2
4

C2 (z) -2 BC t -2 C2 (x) -2 C2 (y);
C4 (y) -4 C4 (w) -4 C4 (z); and

17

The basic idea of neutrality can be summarized as follows: if the individual preferences
over (x; y) in one case are ìidenticalî to the individual preferences over (a; b) in another
case, then the social preference in the latter would place a and b respectively where x and
y Ögured in the former (Sen, 2002; p. 333).
See Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005; p. 386) for an excellent survey of studies on neutrality.
As pointed out, Sen has examined the essential nature of neutrality in terms of ìwelfarismî
(e.g., Sen, 1970, chs. 5 and 5*).
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%ti =%i for i 2 f1; 2; 3g, and
Ci (x) -

C2 (z) C4 (z) -

0
i
0
2
0
4

i

Ci (z) -0i BC t -0i Ci (w) -0i Ci (y) for i 2 f1; 3g ;
2

C2 (w) -02 BC t -02 C2 (x) -02 C2 (y);
C4 (y) -04 C4 (w) -04 C4 (x); and

%0ti =%0i for i 2 f1; 2; 3g. Given this structure, note that [Ci (z) %i Ci (w)
if and only if Ci (x) %0i Ci (z)] holds for every i 2 N . Therefore, if an
0
SRF F satisÖes neutrality, then [zRC w if and only if xRC
z] must hold,
T
0
0
0T
where RC = F (%; RC ) and RC = F (% ; RC ). In contrast, by BWC,
1
1
3
C1 (z) -t1 BC t -t1 C1 (w) implies zPCt w, and C3 (z) -t3 BC t -t3 C3 (w)
3
2
2
implies zPCt w; while by RC, C2 (w) -2 C2 (z) -2 BC t implies zN PCt w.
2
2
Similarly, by BWC, C2 (z) -02 BC t -02 C2 (x) implies zPC0t x; while by RC,
1
1
3
C1 (x) -01 C1 (z) -01 BC t implies zN PC0t x, and C3 (x) -03 C3 (z) -03 BC t
3
T
implies zN PC0t x. Therefore, zPC w and zPC0 x, where RC = F (%; RC
) and
0
0
0T
RC = F (% ; RC ), hold by NR. Thus, this F does not satisfy neutrality.
In summary, the group evaluations scheme constrained by BWC, RM,
and RC and the axiom NR together imply non-welfarism.

5

On (Im)possibility of Social Relation Functions

The aim of this section is to verify the possibility of an SRF satisfying NR
and WP under the constraints of BWC, RM, and RC on group evaluations. This is a legitimate and interesting question when a social choice
problem is to select a public policy to secure basic well-being for all in a
democratic way while admitting a prior treatment of disadvantaged individuals. Indeed, NR speciÖes under what conditions as well as to what
extent some of disadvantaged individuals should be entitled to receive the
prior treatments based on their group evaluations. In contrast, WP equally
treats every individualís appraisal and, moreover, there is no constraint for
the application of this principle. Therefore, NR and WP represent mutually di§erent principles, though they are respectively weak as the claims for
the local decisiveness of speciÖc as well as of all individuals. Then, provided
that the group evaluations satisfy BWC, RM, and RC, it is not obvious
whether the compatibility of WP and NR is veriÖed.
17

We examine, in the Örst step, whether or not there exists an SRF that
satisÖes NR. To do this, we introduce another axiom, the Positive Response
(PR), which is even weaker than NR. Proposition 1 discussed below shows
that there is no SRF that satisÖes PR.
Therefore, in the second step, to avoid this negative result, we introduce
an additional condition, Full Comparability of Destitution (FCD), which insures the full comparability of policies when the well-beings of all of the least
advantaged members become worse than their basic well-being. Proposition
2 proves that under the presumption of FCD, there exists an SRF that
satisÖes NR.
However, in the third step, we show in Theorem 1 that it is impossible to
guarantee the compatibility of NR and WP even under the presumption of
FCD. Given these results, Theorem 2 clariÖes what kind of further condition
is required for the compatibility of these two axioms.
Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the proÖle of the disadvantaged
groups (NCt )t2T is Öxed independent of the types of SRFs. As our Örst step,
let us introduce the following axiom for SRFs:
T
Positive Response (PR): For each C 2 C, each %2 A, each RC
2 DC (%),
0
0
t
and each x; y 2 X, if there exists t 2 T such that xPC y and there is no
00
T
t 00 2 T such that yPCt x, then xPC y holds, where RC = F (%; RC
).

PR is a weaker version of NR. This condition, as well as NR, seems quite
reasonable, given that persons with a particular disadvantage can be considered as ìexpertsî on that disadvantage.
Then,
Proposition 1: There exists a proÖle of well-being appraisals % under which
no SRF F satisÖes PR.
This impossibility holds whenever there are at least three di§erent disadvantaged groups, t1 ; t2 ; t3 2 T , and also at least three alternatives, x; y; z 2
X. To focus on the simplest case, let there be no other group, T = ft1 ; t2 ; t3 g,
i
and each of the three groups have only one member, NCt = fig for i = 1; 2; 3.
Then, each individual i = 1; 2; 3 is also the least advantaged member of her
group, and her appraisal is identical to her groupís appraisal.
Given this setting, assume that the well-being contents of all the three
individuals under any of the three alternatives are worse than their correi
sponding basic well-being contents: BC t -ti Ci (w) for any w 2 fx; y; zg
18

and for each i = 1; 2; 3. Moreover, assume that, according to group t1 ís appraisal, x is better than y, y and z are non-comparable, and z and x are
non-comparable; according to group t2 ís appraisal, y is better than z, z and
x are non-comparable, and x and y are non-comparable; and according to
group t3 ís appraisal, z is better than x, x and y are non-comparable, and so
1
2
3
are y and z. Then, RM implies that xPCt y, yPCt z, and zPCt x. Moreover, let
t1
t1
t2
t2
t3
t3
yN RC
z and zN RC
x; zN RC
x and xN RC
y; and xN RC
y and yN RC
z. Such
group evaluations are available due to the assumptions of the three groupsí
appraisals. However, by PR, the corresponding social evaluation RC should
have xPC y, yPC z, and zPC x, which implies that there is no SRF satisfying
PR.
The above arguments indicate that the incompleteness of group appraisals
is the key factor to generate such a cyclical social evaluation.18 Given this impossibility, let us introduce an additional condition on well-being appraisals:
Full Comparability of Destitution (F CD): For each t 2 T and each
x; y 2 X, if case :) applies, then for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ) and all j 2 LtC (y; %t ),
Ci (x) %t Cj (y) or Cj (y) %t Ci (x).
Case :) is the situation where in each policy, the well-being contents of the
least advantaged are all worse than their basic well-being. F CD requires
that the well-beings of the least advantaged are all comparable when they are
in such ìdestitutionî. This condition seems reasonable, since the plurality
of evaluations over social policies tends to be reduced under a situation of
ìdestitution.î Moreover, it would be desirable that relatively ìless unjustî
policies can be selected under the situation of ìdestitution,î and F CD insures the feasibility of such a social choice.
The next proposition proves that if we introduce F CD into the group
appraisal, we can warrant the existence of an SRF F , which satisÖes NR,
a strong version of PR.
Proposition 2: Let F CD hold. Then, there exists an SRF F that satisÖes
NR.
To show Proposition 2, let us deÖne FN R as follows: for each C 2 C, each
T
NR
%2 A, each RC
2 DC (%), and each x; y 2 X, xRC
y holds if and only if
18

Indeed, in the three-group and three-alternative example, for each group, if at least
one non-comparable pair is changed to be comparable, then the cyclical social evaluation
is no longer generated.
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0

00

t
there exists t 0 2 T such that xRC
y and there is no t 00 2 T such that yPCt x,
NR
T
NR
where RC = FN R (%; RC ). This RC
is shown to be transitive.
As F CD seems to be a strong condition, it is not so surprising that
under this condition, the existence of SRF satisfying NR is ensured. A
more interesting question is whether there exists an SRF satisfying NR and
WP or not. Surprisingly, even under the strong assumption of F CD, there
is no SRF satisfying NR and WP, as the following theorem shows.

Theorem 1: Suppose F CD. Then, there exists a proÖle of well-being appraisals % under which no SRF satisÖes PR and WP.
The essential factor to generate this theorem is that at least two least advantaged members may exist within a group under a social policy, whose
well-being positions relative to basic well-being are di§erent, and at least
one of such members is no longer the least advantaged under another social
policy. To see this, let us suppose that i and j are the least advantaged
members within a group t, where i ís well-being is worse than BC t and j ís
well-being is non-comparable with BC t in policy x , according to the group
appraisal %t . Moreover, let us suppose that all individualsí well-being contents are improved as a result of the change from policy x to policy y, and
j ís well-being becomes better than BC t in y, although i ís is still worse than
BC t . Moreover, let i be the unique least advantaged member of the group
t under y, so that j is no longer the least advantaged of this group. This
situation corresponds to case 9), so BWC applies and this group evaluates
that x is more just than y. Then, if no other groups make any objection,
PR requires that x is better than y. Yet, WP requires that y is better than
x.
This argument suggests that, unlike the Pareto-liberal paradox, PR and
WP can be incompatible even if the social evaluation RC is not requested to
be acyclic. Note also that the existence of only one disadvantaged group is
su¢cient to generate this incompatibility; in contrast, in the Pareto-liberal
paradox, at least two agents must exercise their local decisive powers to
generate a conáict with the Pareto principle.
For the purpose of our four steps, let us introduce an additional condition
that requires even greater comparability of each groupís well-being appraisal:
Dominance (D): For each C 2 C, each t 2 T , each x 2 X, and each
i; j 2 NCt , if i; j 2 LtC (x; %t ), then Ci (x) .t Cj (x).
20

D states that for any social state x 2 X, if there are two individuals who
are both deemed least advantaged under this state, then their well-being
contents are indi§erent. It has the following interesting implication: for each
C 2 C, each t 2 T , each x 2 X, and each i; j 2 NCt with i 2 LtC (x; %t ), if
BC t -t Ci (x) and not BC t %t Cj (x), then Cj (x) -t Ci (x). That is, if one
well-being content is appraised to be worse than BC t , while another is not,
a comparative judgment should be made between the two, in that the latter
is better than the former. Thus, D makes it impossible that j is deemed
least advantaged even if jís well-being content is non-comparable with basic
well-being and there is another least advantaged member i whose well-being
content is worse than basic well-being.
As argued above, the essential factor to derive the incompatibility between NR and WP was the existence of at least two least advantaged members within a group under a social policy, whose well-being positions relative
to basic well-being are di§erent. The assumption of D excludes such a situation, and so it seems indispensable for the existence of SRF satisfying both
of NR and WP. Indeed, the following theorem guarantees the existence of
such an SRF F under the assumption of D in addition to F CD:
Theorem 2: Let F CD and D hold. Then, there exists an SRF F that
satisÖes NR and WP.
To show Theorem 2, let us deÖne FW P as follows: for each C 2 C, each
T
%2 A, each RC
2 DC (%), and each x; y 2 X, xPCW P y holds if and only if
WP
Ci (x) -i Ci (y) holds for all i 2 N , and xIC
y holds if and only if x = y,
WP
T
where RC
= FW P (%; RC
). Moreover, let us deÖne F# as follows: for each
T
T
#
#
NR
WP
C 2 C and each RC
2 DC (%), F# (%; RC
) = RC
, where RC
) RC
[ RC
.
#
In the following discussion, we show that this RC is transitive. Let
#
(x; y) ; (y; z) 2 RC
. Then, there are the following four possible cases:
NR
(1)(x; y) ; (y; z) 2 RC
;
WP
(2)(x; y) ; (y; z) 2 RC
;
NR
WP
(3) (x; y) 2 RC and (y; z) 2 RC
; and
WP
NR
(4) (x; y) 2 RC and (y; z) 2 RC
.
NR
Proposition 2 shows that if case (1) applies, (x; z) 2 RC
holds. Moreover,
WP
it is easy to see that if case (2) applies, then (x; z) 2 RC holds. Next, let
us consider cases (3) and (4):
T
Lemma 2: For each C 2 C, each %2 A, and each RC
2 DC (%), if (x; y) 2
NR
WP
#
RC and (y; z) 2 PC , then (x; z) 2 PC .
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T
Lemma 3: For each C 2 C, each %2 A, and each RC
2 DC (%), if (x; y) 2
WP
NR
#
PC and (y; z) 2 RC , then (x; z) 2 PC .

Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemmas 2 and 3, it holds.
Theorems 1 and 2 indicate that, given the incompleteness of the informational basis, the moderate prior treatments of disadvantaged groups are
unable to ensure consistent and Paretian social decision-making for social
policies. This impossibility, however, does not necessarily imply that there
is an intrinsic conáict between the claim of the prior treatment of speciÖc
individuals and the equal treatment of all. Rather, it may originate from a
lack of su¢cient information on the part of a disadvantaged group to make
a deliberate appraisal of their own states. As condition D and Theorem
2 show, the main reason for the impossibility is the existence of the least
disadvantaged member whose well-being content is deemed non-comparable
to basic well-being despite the existence of another least advantaged whose
well-being content is deemed worse than basic well-being. If such ìtentativeî
non-comparability can be resolved via further scrutiny of this memberís condition, consistent and Paretian social decision-making for desired polices can
be compatible with the prior treatment of speciÖc people.19 In other words,
the di¢culty of constructing the desired social choice due to ìtentativeî
non-comparability within the same disadvantaged group could be resolved
by technical progress at least in the future, which should be discriminated
from the more intrinsic types of impossibility problems.
It is also worth noting that, while F CD and D make any pairs of social
policies satisfying cases 6), 7), 9), :) of group evaluations comparable, the
remaining non-comparable parts in group evaluations is ìassertiveî rather
than ìtentativeî, as warranted by RC for group evaluations. Interestingly,
however, such ìassertiveî non-comparability is also indispensable for the existence of SRFs satisfying NR and WP. Indeed, regardless of whether F CD
and D are imposed, allowing comparability for group evaluations even within
the domains of any pairs satisfying cases ;) and ") may restore the incompatibility of NR and WP, as the following example suggests.
19

The notions of ìtentative incompletenessî and ìassertive incompletenessî are introduced by Sen, where the former consists of ìsome pairs of alternatives that are not yet
ranked (although all may get ranked with more deliberation or information),î while the
latter consists of ìsome pairs of alternatives that are asserted to be ënon-rankableíî (Sen,
2002, p. 182).

22

1

Example 2: Let N = fh; i1 ; j 1 ; i2 ; j 2 g with C 2 C, T = ft1 ; t2 g with NCt =
2
fi1 ; j 1 g and NCt = fi2 ; j 2 g, and X = fx; y; zg. Let Z ) R2 and
Ci1 (x)
Cj 1 (x)
Ci2 (x)
Cj 2 (x)
Ch (x)

=
=
=
=
=

(4; 4) ; Ci1 (y) = (1; 3:3) ; Ci1 (z) = (5; 3) ;
(3:9; 2) ; Cj 1 (y) = (2; 3:6) ; Cj 1 (z) = (6; 3:5) ;
(4; 0:5) ; Ci2 (y) = (3; 3) ; Ci2 (z) = (1; 1) ;
(5; 2) ; Cj 2 (y) = (1:5; 1:5) ; Cj 2 (z) = (1:5; 4) ;
(6; 6) ; Ch (y) = (5; 5) ; Ch (z) = (4; 4) .

For each k 2 fh; i1 ; j 2 g, let %k be given by Ck (v) %k Ck (u) if and only
if Ck (v) / Ck (u); and Ck (v) -k Ck (u) if and only if Ck (v) > Ck (u), where
/ (resp. >) is the vector inequality (resp. the strict vector inequality).
For each l 2 fj 1 ; i2 g, let %l be given by Cl (v) %l Cl (u) if and only if
(Cl (v))1 / (Cl (u))1 ; and Cl (v) -l Cl (u) if and only if (Cl (v))1 > (Cl (u))1 ,
where (Cl (v))1 represents the Örst component of the vector Cl (v). Finally,
1
2
let %t1 )%i1 and %t2 )%j 2 . Moreover, let BC t ) (0; 0:5) and BC t ) (0:5; 0).
Given these settings, it follows that
C` (x) -

LC (x; %t1 ) =
t1

LtC (x; %t2 ) =
2

Then,

` C` (y) for all ` 2 N ;
# 1 $ t1
# $
j ; LC (y; %t1 ) = i1 ;
# 2 $ t2
# $
i ; LC (y; %t2 ) = j 2 ;

# $
1
LtC (z; %t1 ) = i1 ; and
# $
2
LtC (z; %t2 ) = i2 .

not [Cj 1 (x) %t1 Ci1 (y)] & not [Ci1 (y) %t1 Cj 1 (x)]

by Cj 1 (x) # Ci1 (y) & Cj 1 (x) % Ci1 (y);
not [Ci1 (y) %t1 Ci1 (z)] & not [Ci1 (z) %t1 Ci1 (y)]
by Ci1 (y) # Ci1 (z) & Ci1 (y) % Ci1 (z); and
Ci1 (z) -t1 Cj 1 (x) by Ci1 (z) > Cj 1 (x) .
Similarly,
not [Ci2 (x) %t2 Cj 2 (y)] & not [Cj 2 (y) %t2 Ci2 (x)]
by Ci2 (x) # Cj 2 (y) & Ci2 (x) % Cj 2 (y);
not [Ci2 (x) %t2 Ci2 (z)] & not [Ci2 (z) %t2 Ci2 (x)]
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by Ci2 (z) # Ci2 (x) & Ci2 (z) % Ci2 (x); and
Cj 2 (y) -t2 Ci2 (z) by Cj 2 (y) > Ci2 (z) .
1

2

1

2

t
t
Now, let RC
and RC
do not satisfy RC, and so zPCt x and yPCt z, while
t1
t1
t2
t2
xN RC y, yN RC z, xN RC y, and zN RC
x. Then, NR implies that zPC x and
T
yPC z, while xPC y follows from WP, where RC = F (%; RC
). Thus, RC
violates transitivity.

The above example implies that, under the imposition of F CD and D, a
further increase of comparable parts in group evaluations via the elimination
of RC results in the impossibility of SRFs satisfying NR and WP.

6

Discussion

Before concluding the paper, we Örst comment on another prominent feature
of our SRF framework. In Arrovian social welfare functions, a social choice is
made simply on the basis of the structure of preference proÖles announced by
individuals and thus is independent of information on the characteristics of
individuals and alternatives. Note that this property of Arrovian social welfare functions derives from the three conditions imposed by Arrow, namely
the universal domain, the Pareto principle, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is known that these three conditions lead to neutrality or
welfarism, that is, these conditions together require that individualsí ordinal
rankings of alternatives are the sole relevant information to make a social
choice. This structure of Arrovian models well represents the spirit of traditional liberalism, which gives priority to individual autonomy and prohibits
arbitrarily unequal treatment.20 In contrast, in our SRFs, a social choice is
made on the basis of not only the preference proÖles expressed by individuals
but also the information of the characteristics of individuals and of alternatives. We have shown that this change is a clue to avoid welfaristic nature of
social choice. Besides, this formulation allows us to explore another possibility of liberalism, that is, substantive equality of political freedom that allows
the preferential treatment of ordinal rankings. The reasonableness of such
preferential treatment is ensured by the introduction of an explicit device
20

According to Arrow,ìThe decision as to which preferences are relevant and which are
not is itself a value judgement and cannot be settled on an a priori basisî (Arrow, 1963,
p. 18).
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for public scrutiny, which is represented in this paper by the observability of
well-being indicators and the three-component structure of the informational
basis.
Second, let us clarify the basic ideas underlying this paper. The Örst idea
is relevant to two kinds of ìincomparability.î In this paper, the least advantaged are identiÖed as individuals whose well-being contents never dominate
the well-beings of others in each social policy. Due to the multiplicity of attributes that deÖne the notion of well-being, there could remain incomparability among the least advantaged even within a group. However, the meaning
of incomparability within a group should be kept distinct from incomparability (also called ìincommensurabilityî) between groups. The reason is that
the former is a technical or political problem and certain conditions of compromise can be introduced to deal with it, as we have done by introducing
F DC and D in this paper. On the other hand, the latter is a kind of incomparability for which no compromise can be found as long as the plurality
of disadvantages is taken seriously. This distinction between these two forms
of incomparability corresponds to the distinction introduced by Sen (2002)
between ìtentative incompletenessî and ìassertive incompleteness.î
The second idea concerns two types of conáicts between groupsóone
arises from each groupís need to achieve basic well-being, while the other
derives from each groupís desire to enjoy well-being beyond basic well-being.
While the former type of conáict is avoidable if there are su¢cient resources
to secure basic well-being for all groups, the latter is not, if the desire towards better well-being is without limit. The former deserves consideration
in terms of justice that this paper is concerned with, while the latter does
not. This is the reason why in this paper, the application of the monotonicity condition is restricted to the domain below basic well-being through the
application of RM, while in the domain above basic well-being, conáicts are
avoided through the application of RC, which prohibits groups from making
rankings.

7

Conclusion

This paper addressed and formulated a social choice problem for ìsecuring basic well-being for all,î where individual well-being was deÖned in the
space of multi-dimensional attributes; the notion of basic well-being was
introduced as a critical reference point of multi-dimensional well-beings in
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order to identify the ìinjusticeî of social policies; and the mutually incommensurable types of disadvantages were allowed to exist. Given such an
environment, a new scheme of social choice rule, a social relation function
(SRF), was introduced with three elements of informational basis: individualsí appraisals of their respective well-being contents; each disadvantaged
groupís appraisal of its membersí well-being contents to identify the least
advantaged members on the basis of the membersí shared conception of the
good; and each groupís evaluation of alternative social policies, formed on
the basis of its own appraisal by focusing on the least advantaged members.
In the scheme of SRF, while individualsí appraisal is equally treated, group
evaluations are allowed a prior treatment as experts on their own disadvantages. The former property is formulated as weak Pareto condition (WP)
and the latter as non-negative response (NR) along with three constraints,
basic well-being condition (BWC), restricted monotonocity (RM), and refrain condition (RC), on the admissible group evaluations. It was shown that
NR together with BWC, RM, and RC makes an SRF non-welfaristic.
Then, the paper showed that the three constraints are compatible in that
a group evaluation is transitive if it satisÖes these constraints, while there
exists an SRF that satisÖes NR if full comparability among the disadvantaged individualsí well-being contents within a group is allowed under the
situation of ìdestitution.î It also showed that any SRF cannot simultaneously satisfy WP and NR together with BWC, RM, and RC if ìtentativeî
non-comparability of the least advantagedís well-being contents within the
same group remains, while there exists an SRF satisfying these axioms if the
remaining non-comparability is ìassertive,î where the ìassertiveî property
of the remaining non-comparability is insured by RC. Finally, it was shown
that the existence of the ìassertiveî non-comparability is indispensable for
the existence of such an SRF.
Essentially, this study presents the set of disadvantaged types, the proÖles
of individual and group appraisals, and group evaluations along with the
concrete conceptions of basic well-being contents for the respective groups as
parameters in the framework of SRFs. It would be interesting to develop an
analytical framework to address the structure of interaction in the formation
process of these proÖles and lists, as the adoption of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its ratiÖcation by each party suggest.
This is thus a topic worth discussing in future research.
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Appendix: Proofs

t
t
t
Proof of Lemma 1. Let xRC
yRC
z. We will show xRC
z holds. Note that
t
xRC y is derived from imposing either BWC or RM upon the pair (x; y).
t
Case 1. Assume xRC
y by BWC.
Then, Ci (x) %t BC t holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), or not [BC t %t Ci (x)] &
not [Ci (x) %t BC t ] holds for some i 2 LtC (x; %t ).

Sub-case 1-1. BC t .t Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t ).
t
Then, xRC
y is derived by imposing BWC under the case 6-1) or 6-2).
Suppose that case 6-1) holds but case 6-2) does not hold. Hence, Ci (x) .t
t
BC t holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), which implies that yRC
x is also derived from
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t
t
BWC under case 6)-1). Thus, xIC
y. Moreover, yRC
z is only derived from
BWC upon the pair (y; z). Therefore, the pair (x; z) satisÖes case 6-1) or
t
6-2), so that xRC
z holds by BWC. In particular, if yPCt z, then xPCt z also
t
t
holds, while if yIC
z, then xIC
z also holds.
Suppose that case 6-2) holds. Then, Ci (x) -t BC t holds for all i 2
t
LtC (x; %t ) and xPCt y. Again, yRC
z is only derived from applying BWC to
the pair (y; z). Therefore, the pair (x; z) satisÖes case 6-2), so that xPCt z
holds by BWC.

Sub-case 1-2. not [Cj (y) %t BC t ] and not [BC t %t Cj (y)] for some j 2
LtC (y; %t ).
Then, case 7) holds for the pair (x; y), so that xPCt y holds. Moreover,
t
yRC
z is only derived from BWC under case 9) upon the pair (y; z), where
t
BC -t Cj (z) must hold for all j 2 LtC (z; %t ), so that yPCt z holds. Therefore,
the pair of (x; z) satisÖes case 6-2), so that xPCt z holds by BWC.
Sub-case 1-3. BC t -t Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t ).
Then, the case 6-2) or 9) holds for the pair (x; y), so that xPCt y holds.
t
Moreover, yRC
z is then derived only from RM upon the pair (y; z), which
implies that Ci (y) %t Cj (z) holds for all i 2 LtC (y; %t ) and all j 2 LtC (z; %t ),
so that BC t -t Cj (z) holds for all j 2 LtC (z; %t ) by the transitivity of %t .
Thus, the pair of (x; z) corresponds to the case 6-2) or 9), so that xPCt z
holds by BWC.
t
Case 2. Assume xRC
y by RM.
t
Then, yRC z should also be derived from RM upon the pair (y; z). Hence,
the pair (x; z) satisÖes case :). Moreover, Ci (x) %t Cj (y) %t Ch (z) holds
for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), all j 2 LtC (y; %t ), and all h 2 LtC (z; %t ). Then, by
the transitivity of %t , Ci (x) %t Ch (z) holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ) and all
t
h 2 LtC (z; %t ). Thus, xRC
z holds by RM. Moreover, if xPCt y or yPCt z, then
t
t
t
xPCt z holds, while if xIC
y and yIC
z, then xIC
z holds by the transitivity of
%t and RM.

Proof of Proposition 1. Let a binary relation PCP R be deÖned as: for each
t
C 2 C, each (RC
)t2T 2 DC (%), and each x; y 2 X,
there exists t 0

xPCP R y holds if and only if
0
00
2 T such that xPCt y and there is no t 00 2 T such that yPCt x.

t
Note that any SRF F should associate a quasi-ordering RC = F (C; %; (RC
)t2T )
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t
with each (C; %; (RC
)t2T ) such that PCP R 0 RC if F satisÖes PR. Therefore,
it is su¢cient for this proof to show that PCP R is not transitive.
t
Let ft1 ; t2 ; t3 g = T , and let us consider (C; %; (RC
)t2T ) satisfying the
following properties:

(1) Let BC t -t1 Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ); BC t -t1 Cj (y) for all
1
1
1
j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ); and BC t -t1 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Moreover,
1
1
let Ci (x) -t1 Cj (y) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ) and all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ); not
1
[Ci (x) %t1 Ch (z)] & not [Ch (z) %t1 Ci (x)] for some i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ) and some
1
h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ); and not [Cj (y) %t1 Ch (z)] & not [Ch (z) %t1 Cj (y)] for some
1
1
j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ) and some h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ).
1

1

1

(2) Let BC t -t2 Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t2 ); BC t -t2 Cj (y) for all
2
2
2
j 2 LtC (y; %t2 ); and BC t -t2 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t2 ). Moreover,
2
2
let Ci (y) -t2 Ch (z) for all i 2 LtC (y; %t2 ) and all h 2 LtC (z; %t2 ); not
2
[Ci (x) %t2 Cj (y)] & not [Cj (y) %t2 Ci (x)] for some i 2 LtC (x; %t2 ) and some
2
j 2 LtC (y; %t2 ); and not [Ci (x) %t2 Ch (z)] & not [Ch (z) %t2 Ci (x)] for some
2
2
i 2 LtC (y; %t2 ) and some h 2 LtC (z; %t2 ).
2

2

2

(3) Let BC t -t3 Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t3 ); BC t -t3 Cj (y) for all
3
3
3
j 2 LtC (y; %t3 ); and BC t -t3 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t3 ). Moreover,
3
3
let Ch (z) -t3 Ci (x) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t3 ) and all i 2 LtC (x; %t3 ); not
3
[Cj (y) %t3 Ch (z)] & not [Ch (z) %t3 Cj (y)] for some h 2 LtC (z; %t3 ) and
some j 2 Lt3
C (y; %t3 ); and not [Ci (x) %t3 Cj (y)] & not [Cj (y) %t3 Ci (x)] for
3
t3
some i 2 LC (x; %t3 ) and some j 2 LtC (y; %t3 ).
3

3

1

3

1

1

t
t
Under (1), xPCt y by RM, and zN RC
x and yN RC
z by RC. Under
3
t2
t2
t2
(2), yPC z by RM, and zN RC x and xN RC y by RC. Under (3), zPCt x by
3
3
t
t
RM, and yN RC
z and xN RC
y by RC. Therefore, by the deÖnition of PR,
PR
PR
PR
xPC yPC zPC x holds, which implies that PCP R is not transitive.
NR
NR
Proof of Proposition 2. Let xRC
yRC
z. This implies that there exists
1
t1
t
t 2 T such that xRC y and not yPC x for any other t 2 T , and there exists
t2
t1
t2 2 T such that yRC
z and not zPCt y for any other t 2 T . Moreover, xRC
y
t2
(resp. yRC z) is derived from BWC by applying either of the cases 6), 7),
and 9); or it is derived from RM by applying case :).
1

1

1

t
t
1. First of all, let us show that if xRC
y and not zPCt y, then xRC
z.
1

t
Case 1: Let xRC
y be derived from BWC by applying 6-1).
1
1
1
t
Then, BC %t1 Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), and Ci (x) %t1 BC t for
1
1
all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ). Suppose zPCt x. Note that neither of the case 6), 7),
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1

1

t
9), :) can derive zPCt x, thus (z; x) satisÖes ;) or "), which leads to xN RC
z
t1
t1
t1
by RC, a contradiction. Thus, xN RC z or xRC z holds. Suppose xN RC z.
1
This implies that (x; z) corresponds to ;), so that Ci (z) -t1 BC t for all
1
1
i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, zPCt y from BWC by applying case 6-2), which is a
t1
contradiction. Thus, xRC
z holds.
1

t
Case 2: Let
h xPC y be derived
i from BWC by applying 7).
1
1
1
Then, not Cj (y) %t1 BC t for some j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), and Ci (x) %t1 BC t

for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ). Suppose zPCt x. Note that neither of 6), 7), 9), :)
1
t1
can derive zPCt x, thus (z; x) corresponds to ;) or "), which leads to xN RC
z
1
1
1
t
t
t
by RC, a contradiction. Thus, xN RC z or xRC z holds. Suppose xN RC z.
1
This implies that (x; z) satisÖes property ;), so that Ci (z) -t1 BC t for
1
1
all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, zPCt y from BWC by applying case 7), which is
1
t1
a contradiction from not zPCt y. Thus, xRC
z holds. Finally, suppose that
1
t1
zRC
x. This is only available by applying case 6-1), and Ci (x) .t1 BC t for
1
1
1
1
all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ) and Ci (z) .t1 BC t for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, zPCt y
1
from BWC by applying case 7), which is a contradiction from not zPCt y.
1
t1
Thus, zRC
x is impossible, so that xPCt z holds.
1

1

1

Case 3: Let xPCt y be derived from BWC by applying the case 6-2) or
9).

Case 3-1: Suppose that BC t .t1 Ci (y) for all i 2 LtC (y; %t1 ).
1
1
t1
Then, Ci (x) -t1 BC t for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ) so that zRC
x is never
1
t1
t1
possible. Moreover, if zN RC x, then Ci (z) -t1 BC for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 )
1
due to RC under case ;). Then, zPCt y by BWC under case 6-2), which is
1
1
a contradiction from not zPCt y. Thus, xPCt z is only possible.
1
1
Case 3-2: Suppose that BC t -t1 Ci (y) for all i 2 LtC (y; %t1 ).
1
t
Case h3-2-1: Suppose izRC
x.
1
1
If not Cj (x) %t1 BC t for some j 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), then, in order to ensure
1

1

t
zRC
x, Ci (z) %t1 BC t must hold for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Thus, zPCt y from
1
BWC under case 6-2), which is a contradiction from not zPCt y. If Cj (x) %t1
1
1
t1
BC t for all j 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), then zRC
x is possible only from BWC under
1
1
case 6). Then, it implies that Cj (z) %t1 BC t for all j 2 LtC (z; %t1 ), which
1
again implies zPCt y by BWC under case 6-2), which is a contradiction from
1
t1
not zPCt y. In summary, zRC
x is impossible.
t1
Case 3-2-2: Suppose zN RC
x.
1
t
Note that zN RC x is derived from RC under case ;) or ").
Case 3-2-2-1: Let case ;) hold.
1

1

1
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1

Then Ci (z) -t1 BC t holds for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ), so that zPCt y from
BWC by applying 6-2), a contradiction.
Case 3-2-2-1: Let case ") hold.
Then
h
i
1
1
not Cj (z) %t1 BC t for some j 2 LtC (z; %t1 ); or
h
i
1
t1
not BC %t1 Ci (z) for some i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ).
1

1

1

t
Let both the former and the latter hold. Then, hby the property of
i LC (z; %ht1 ),
i
1
1
1
there is a common i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) such that not Ci (z) %t1 BC t and not BC t %t1 Ci (z) .
1

1

t
Then, given that case ") holds for zN RC
x, case 9) must hold for having
1
1
t
t
xPC y. Then, zPC y holds from BWC under case 9), a contradiction.
Hence, either the former does not hold or the latter does not hold. Let
1
1
the former do not hold, so that Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ).
1
Then, zPCt y from BWC under case 6)-2), a contradiction. Let the latter
1
1
1
do not hold, so that BC t %t1 Ci (z) for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Thus, not zPCt y
t1
is derived from RM under case :). Then, by F CD, yRC
z holds. Thus,
1
t1
by transitivity, xPCt z, which is a contradiction from zN RC
x. In summary,
1
t1
zN RC
x is impossible. Thus, xPCt z holds.
1

t
Case 4: Let xRC
y be derived from RM under case :).
1
1
1
t
Then, BC -t1 Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ); and also, BC t -t1 Ci (y)
1
1
t1
t1
for all i 2 LtC (y; %t1 ). Since not zPCt y, either yRC
z or yN RC
z. Suppose
1
1
1
1
t
t
t
t
yN RC z. Since BC -t1 Ci (y) for all i 2 LC (y; %t1 ), yN RC z implies that
1
1
BC t -t1 Ci (z) for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). However, by F CD, RM can be
t1
applied to evaluate (y; z), which implies not yN RC
z, a contradiction. Thus,
t1
t1
t1
yRC z. Then, by transitivity of RC , xRC z holds.
1

1

1

t
t
In summary, if xRC
y and not zPCt y, then xRC
z.
2

2

2

t
2. Second, let us show that if yRC
z and not yPCt x, then not zPCt x.
t2
t2
t2
Suppose zPC x. Since yRC z, it follows from transitivity of RC
that (y; x) 2
2
2
yPCt x, which is a contradiction. Thus not zPCt x.

3. Third, let us show that for any t 2 T n ft1 g, if not yPCt x and not zPCt y,
then not zPCt x. Suppose, in the contrary, zPCt x. Then, it is derived from
BWC under either of the case 6-2), 7), or 9); or it is derived from RM-2)
under case :).
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Let zPCt x be derived from BWC. Suppose that the case 6-2) or 9) is
applied with BC t -t Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ). Thus, by F CD and RM,
t
t
it is impossible that yN RC
x. Thus, xRC
y. Then, by transitivity, zPCt y,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose that zPCt x is derived from BWC by applying property 7). Then,
not [Ci (x) %t1 BC t ] and not [BC t %t1 Ci (x)] hold for some i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ).
t
t
t
In this case, xRC
y or xN RC
y. Let xRC
y. This case is derived from BWC
t
by applying 9), which implies that BC -t Ci (y) for all i 2 LtC (y; %t ). Then,
zPCt y holds by BWC with applying 6-2). Thus, a contradiction. Next, let
t
xN RC
y. This is derived from RC by applying case "). To apply case ") for
(x; y), the case that not [Cj (y) %t BC t ] and not [BC t %t1 Cj (y)] for some
j 2 LtC (y; %t ) must hold. Then, zPCt y is derived from BWC by applying
case 7), which is a contradiction.
Suppose that zPCt x is derived from BWC by applying case 6-2) with
t
BC t .t Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ). Then, yN RC
x is impossible. Thus,
t
t
xRC y. Then, by transitivity, zPC y, which is a contradiction. In summary,
zPCt x cannot be derived from BWC.
Let zPCt x be derived from RM-2) under case :). Then, BC t -t Ci (x) for
t
all i 2 LtC (x; %t ). Thus, by F CD and RM, it is impossible that yN RC
x.
t
t
Thus, xRC y. Then, by transitivity, zPC y, which is a contradiction. Thus,
zPCt x cannot be derived from RM-2).
In summary, for any t 2 T n ft1 g, if not yPCt x and not zPCt y, then not
t
zPC x.
1

t
4. By the above arguments of 1. and 3., we have xRC
z and not zPCt x
NR
for any t 2 T n ft1 g. Thus, xRC
z holds.

Proof of Theorem 1. Let T = ft1 g, fi; j; h; h0 g 8 NCt1 = N , LtC (x; %t1 ) =
1
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0
fi; j; hg, LtC (y; %t1 ) = fi; j; hg, and Lt1
C (z; %t1 ) = fi; j; h; h g. Suppose that:
1

BC t

1

BC

t1

BC

t1
t1

not [BC
Ci (x)
Cj (x)
Ch (x)
Ch0 (x)

-

t1 Ci

-

t1 Ci

(x) .t1 Cj (x) .t1 Ch (x) ;

-

t1 Ci

(y) .t1 Cj (y) .t1 Ch (y) ;

%
-

t 1 C h0

(z) .t1 Cj (z) .t1 Ch (z) ;

(z) or Ch0 (z) %t1 BC t ];
i Ci (y) -i Ci (z) ;
j Cj (y) -j Cj (z) ;
h Ch (y) -h Ch (z) ; and
h0 Ch0 (y) -h0 Ch0 (z) .
1

1

Moreover, for any k 2 t1 nfi; j; h; h0 g, let Ck (z) - t1 Ch0 (z), Ck (x) -t1 BC t ,
1
1
Ck (y) -t1 BC t , Ck (z) -t1 BC t , and Ck (x) -k Ck (y) -k Ck (z).
1
1
1
Then, since BC t -t1 Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), and not BC t %t1
1
1
1
Ch0 (z) & not Ch0 (z) %t1 BC t for h0 2 LtC (z; %t1 ), it follows that zPCt x from
BWC under case 9). Thus, since T = ft1 g by NR, zPC x holds; while by
WP, xPC z holds. Thus, a contradiction, which implies NR and WP are
incompatible.
NR
Proof of Lemma 2. 1. Let xRC
y and yPCW P z. This implies that there
1
t
exists t1 2 T such that xRC
y and not yPCt x for any other t 2 T , and
t1
Ci (y) -i Ci (z) holds for all i 2 N . Moreover, xRC
y is derived from BWC
by applying either of the case 6), 7), or 9); or it is derived from RM by
applying case :).
2. We show that for any t 2 T , (i) not yPCt x, and (ii) Ci (y) -i Ci (z)
t
t
holds for all i 2 N together imply that xRC
z or xN RC
z. First of all, not
t
t
t
t
yPC x if and only if xRC y or xN RC y. If xRC y, then it is derived from BWC
by applying the case 6), 7), or 9), or from RM by applying property :). If
t
xN RC
y, then it is derived from RC by applying the case ;) or ").
t
2-i). Suppose xRC
y is derived from BWC by applying the case 6), 7),
t
or 9). Then, not [BC %t Ci (x)] for some i 2 LtC (x; %t ). Note, since Ci (y) -i
Ci (z) holds for all i 2 NCt , not [Ch (z) %t Cj (y)] holds for any j 2 LtC (y; %t )
and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ). To see this, let us suppose that [Ch (z) %t Cj (y)]
holds for some j 2 LtC (y; %t ) and some h 2 LtC (z; %t ). Then, it follows that
Ch (z) %t Cj (y) -j Cj (z). If j 2 LtC (z; %t ), then Cj (z) .t Ch (z) holds by
D, which implies Ch (z) %j Cj (y) -j Cj (z) .j Ch (z) by the deÖnition of
%t ) \i2NCt %i . However, it is a contradiction, since %j must be transitive.
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Therefore, j 2
= LtC (z; %t ), which implies that there exists k 2 LtC (z; %t ) such
that Ch (z) %t Cj (y) -j Cj (z) -t Ck (z). Then, since Ck (z) .t Ch (z), it is
also a contradiction by the deÖnition of %t and the transitivity of %j . Thus,
not [Ch (z) %t Cj (y)] holds for any j 2 LtC (y; %t ) and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ).
Suppose zPCt x. Then, if this relation is derived from BWC, it is due to
the application of the case 7) with not [BC t %t Ci (x)] and not [Ci (x) %t BC t ]
for some i 2 LtC (x; %t ). This implies that Ci (z) %t BC t for any i 2
t
LtC (z; %t ). In this case, xRC
y is derived from BWC by applying the case
t
9), so that BC -t Ci (y) for any i 2 LtC (y; %t ). Thus, by the transitivity,
[Ch (z) -t Cj (y)] holds for any j 2 LtC (y; %t ) and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ), which
is a contradiction. Since there is no other situation to generate zPCt x together
t
with xRC
y under BWC and the case 6), 7), or 9), the last result implies
t
t
t
that zPC x is impossible. Thus, xRC
z or xN RC
z.
t
2-ii). Suppose xN RC y is derived from RC by applying the case ;) or ").
t
If ;) is applied for xN RC
y, then [Ci (x) -t BC t ] holds for any i 2 LtC (x; %t ).
t
t
Then, xRC
z or xN RC
z is derived by applying either of the case 6), 7), or
;).
t
If case ") is applied for xN RC
y, then [not [BC t %t Ci (x)] for some i 2
LtC (x; %t ) and not [Cj (x) %t BC t ] for some j 2 LtC (x; %t )] and [not [BC t %t Ci (y)]
for some i 2 LtC (y; %t ) and not [Cj (y) %t BC t ] for some j 2 LtC (y; %t )].
Note that in such a case, it does not follow that [Ci (x) -t BC t ] for some i 2
LtC (x; %t ) and [BC t -t Cj (x)] for some j 2 LtC (x; %t ). Indeed, if so, the transitivity of %t implies Ci (x) -t Cj (x) for some i; j 2 LtC (x; %t ), which is a contradiction from the deÖnition of LtC (x; %t ). Thus, if not [BC t %t Ci (x)] for
some i 2 LtC (x; %t ), then not [Ci (x) %t BC t ] also holds. Similarly, not [BC t %t Ci (y)]
and not [Ci (y) %t BC t ] for some i 2 LtC (y; %t ) also hold. Then, by either
t
t
RC with case ") or BWC with 9), xRC
z or xN RC
z is derived.
t
2-iii). Suppose xRC y is derived from RM by applying case :). Then,
since Ci (y) -i Ci (z) holds for all i 2 NCt , we have, by combining with
RM with case :), Ci (x) %t Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for any i 2 LtC (x; %t ) and
any j 2 LtC (y; %t ). By deÖnition of LtC (z; %t ), F CD, and D, Cj (z) %t
Ch (z) holds for any h 2 LtC (z; %t ) and any j 2 LtC (y; %t ). Indeed, unless
j 2 LtC (z; %t ), there is another h 2 LtC (z; %t ) such that Cj (z) -t Ch (z).
Then, since Ch (z) .t Ch0 (z) holds for any h0 2 LtC (z; %t ) by the deÖnition
of LtC (z; %t ), F CD, and D, the desired result holds. Then, it follows that
Cj (y) -t Ch (z) for any j 2 LtC (y; %t ) and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ) from the
deÖnition of LtC (z; %t ). To see this, suppose Cj (y) -t Ch (z) for some j 2
LtC (y; %t ) and some h 2 LtC (z; %t ). Then, by the deÖnition of %t , Cj (y) -j
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Cj (z) %j Ch (z) %j Cj (y), which is a contradiction. Thus, Cj (y) -t Ch (z) for
any j 2 LtC (y; %t ) and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ). Thus, Ci (x) %t Cj (y) -t Ch (z)
for any i 2 LtC (x; %t ), any j 2 LtC (y; %t ), and any h 2 LtC (z; %t ). By the
transitivity of %t , Ci (x) -t Ch (z) for any i 2 LtC (x; %t ) and any h 2 LtC (z; %t
t
). Since xRC
y is derived from RM by applying case :), the transitivity of
%t implies that BCtt -t Ch (z) for any h 2 LtC (z; %t ), and so by RM with
case :), xPCt z holds.
t1
3. Let xRC
y be derived from BWC by applying either of the case 6),
7), or 9).
t1
3-i): Let xRC
y be derived from BWC by applying case 6). Then,
1
1
1
t
BC %t1 Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), and Ci (x) %t1 BC t for all i 2
1
1
1
LtC (x; %t1 ). Then, we can show that Ci (x) %t1 BC t holds for every i 2 NCt .
1
1
First, if i 2 NCt is Ci (x) -t1 Cj (x) for some j 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), it is obvious. If
1
1
1
i 2 NCt is not [Ci (x) -t1 Cj (x)] for any j 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), then i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ),
1
so that Ci (x) %t1 BC t holds.
1
Let us consider LtC (z; %t1 ). Since Ci (y) -i Ci (z) holds for all i 2 N ,
we can show as in the step 2-i) of this proof that not [Ci (z) %t1 Cj (y)]
1
1
1
holds for any j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ) and any i 2 LtCh (z; %t1 ). Then, isince BC t %t1
1
1
Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), not Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for any
h
i
1
1
1
i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). In fact, if Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for some i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ),
it implies Ci (z) %j BC t %j Cj (y) -j Cj (z) %j Ch (z) .j Ci (z) for some
1
h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) as argued
in the step 2-i)
h
i of this proof, which is a contradic1
t1
tion. Therefore, not Ci (z) %t1 BC
holds for any i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Thus,
1

1

xPCt z is derived from BWC by applying the case 6-2) or 7). Note that in
this case, it can be shown that not zPCW P x holds.
1
3-ii): Let xPCt y be derived
h from BWC iby applying
h case 7) but noti ap1
t1
plying case 6). Then, not Cj (y) %t1 BC
and not Cj (y) %t1 BC t for

t
t
any j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ) due to D, and
h Ci (x) %t1 BC
i for all
h i 2 LC (x; %t1 i).
1
1
Then, by the property of %t1 , not Cj (y) %j BC t and not Cj (y) %j BC t .
1

1

1

1

1

t
t
Note that as shown in the step 2) of this proof, xRC
z or xN RC
z holds.
1
t
t1
Suppose xIC z. This is possible only when Ci (x) .t1 BC for all i 2
1
1
t1
LC (x; %t1 ) and Ch (z) .t1 BC t for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Therefore, Ch (y) -h
1
1
1
BC t .t1 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Since BC t .t1 Ch (z) for all
1
1
1
1
h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) implies BC t .h Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ), LtC (z; %t1 ) \
1
LtC (y; %t1 ) = ? follows from Ci (y) -i Ci (z) for all i 2 N . Then, since
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1

1

t
Cj (z) -th1 BC t , Cj (y) i j Cj (z) -j BC holds, which is a contradiction
1
t1
from not Cj (y) %j BC t . Thus, xIC
z is impossible.
1

t
Suppose xN RC
z. This implies that (x; z) corresponds to case ;), so
1
1
t1
that Ci (z) -t1 BC for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Again, in this case, LtC (z; %t1 ) \
1
1
1
LtC (y; %t1 ) = ? follows from j 2
= LtC (z; %t1 ). If j 2 LtC (z; %ht1 ), then Cj (y) -ij

Cj (z) -j BC t holds, which is a contradiction from not Cj (y) %j BC t .
1

1

However, Ci (z) -t1 BC t for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) implies that Ci (z) -i BC t
1
1
for all i 2 NCt . Therefore, Cj (y) -j Cj (z) -j BC t holds, which is again a
t1
contradiction. Thus, xN RC
z is impossible.
1
t
In conclusion, xPC z holds. Note that in this case, it can be shown that
not zPCW P x holds.
1
3-iii): Let xPhCt y be derived from
i BWC by applying the case 6-2) or 9).
1
1
1
This implies not BC t %t1 Ci (x) for some i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), and BC t -t1
1

1

1

Cj (y) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ).
1
t1
t1
Suppose zRC
x. In order to ensure zRC
x, Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for all i 2
1
1
1
LtC (z; %t1 ). However, since BC t -t1 Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ),
1
1
we have Ci (z) %t1 BC t -t1 Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ) and all
1
1
1
i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Therefore, BC t -j Cj (z) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ). However,
1
1
1
Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) implies that Ci (z) %t1 BC t
1
1
1
holds for all i 2 NCt , and so Ci (z) %i BC t holds for all i 2 NCt . Thus, we
t1
have a contradiction. Thus, zRC
x is impossible.
t1
t1
Suppose zN RC
x. Note that zN RC
x is derived from RC by applying
1
the case ;) or "). If case ;) is applied, then Ci (z) -t1 BC t holds for all
1
i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, as in the same argument as the case of supposing
1
t
t1
zRC
x, we have a contradiction. Thus, zN RC
x is impossible to be derived
from RC by applying the case ;).
If case ") is applied, then
h
i
1
1
not Cj (z) %t1 BC t for some j 2 LtC (z; %t1 );
h
i
1
1
or not BC t %t1 Ci (z) for some i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ).
1

Let the former do not hold, so that Ci (z) %t1 BC t holds for all i 2
1
1
LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, again, since BC t -t1 Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all j 2
1
1
1
LtC (y; %t1 ), we have BC t -t1 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ) by applying D,
1
which is a contradiction. Let the latter do not hold, so that BC t %t1 Ci (z)
1
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for all i 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Again, since BC t -t1 Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all
1
1
1
j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), we have BC t -t1 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then,
1
t1
not zPCt y is derived from RM by applying case :). Then, by F CD, yRC
z.
t1
t1
Thus, by transitivity, xPC z, which is a contradiction from zN RC x. In sumt1
mary, zN RC
x does not hold.
1
In conclusion, xPCt z holds. Note that in this case, it can be shown that
not zPCW P x holds.
1
t1
4. Let xRC
y be derived from RM by applying case :). Then, BC t -t1
1
1
1
Ci (x) for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ); and also, BC t -t1 Ci (y) for all i 2 LtC (y; %t1 ).
1
1
Since BC t -t1 Cj (y) -j Cj (z) for all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ), D implies that
1
1
BC t -t1 Ch (z) for all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Thus, by F CD and RM with case
t1
:), yRC
z is derived. Hence, the pair (x; z) corresponds to case :). Moreover,
1
1
Ci (x) %t1 Cj (y) -t1 Ch (z) holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), all j 2 LtC (y; %t1 ),
1
and all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Then, by the transitivity of %t1 , Ci (x) -t1 Ch (z)
1
1
1
holds for all i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ) and all h 2 LtC (z; %t1 ). Thus, xPCt z holds by
RM. Note that in this case, it can be shown that not zPCW P x holds.
1
NR
5. In combining the above arguments, if xRC
y and yPCW P z, then xPCt z
t1
t
t
or xN RC
z holds and xRC
z or xN RC
z for any t 2 T n ft1 g, thus xPCN R z or
NR
xN RC
z. Moreover, not zPCW P x holds. Therefore, by the transitive closure,
#
xPC z.
1

1

NR
Proof of Lemma 3. Let xPCW P y and yRC
z. This implies that there exists
1
1
t
t
t 2 T such that yRC z and not zPC y for any other t 2 T , and Ci (x) -i Ci (y)
holds for all i 2 N .
1
1. We will show that, in this case, xPCt z holds.
1
First, if yPCt z is derived from BWC by applying either of the case 6-2),
1
7), or 9), then xPCt z is derived from BWC by applying either of the case
6-2), 7), or 9).
t1
t1
Second, if yIC
z is derived from BWC by applying case 6-1), then xRC
z
1
t
is derived from BWC by case 6). Moreover, since Ci (x) -t1 BC for all
1
1
i 2 LtC (x; %t1 ), xPCt z holds by BWC with case 6-2).
1
t
Third, let yRC
z be derived from RM by applying case :). If Ci (x) 9t
1
t
BC for all i 2 LtC (x; %t ), then xPCt z is derived from RM and F CD;
1
otherwise, then xPCt z is derived from BWC and F CD by applying the
case 6-2) or 9).
1
In summary, xPCt z holds for t1 2 T .
2. Next, we will show that not zPCt x for any t 2 T n ft1 g. Note that for
any t 2 T n ft1 g, (i) not zPCt y, and (ii) Ci (x) -i Ci (y) holds for all i 2 N
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t
t
together imply that xRC
z or xN RC
z. First of all, not zPCt y if and only if
t
t
yRC z or yN RC z.
t
If yRC
z, then it is derived from BWC by applying the case 6), 7), or
9), or from RM by applying case :). Then, as shown in the case of 1., we
can see that xPCt z holds for any t 2 T n ft1 g.
t
If yN RC
z, then it is derived from RC by applying the case ;) or "). If
t
t
case ;) is applied for yN RC
z, then xN RC
z also holds by RC. If case ")
t
t
is applied for yN RC z, then [not [BC %t Ci (y)] for some i 2 LtC (y; %t ) and
not [Cj (y) %t BC t ] for some j 2 LtC (y; %t )] and [not [BC t %t Ci (z)] for some
i 2 LtC (z; %t ) and not [Cj (z) %t BC t ] for some j 2 LtC (z; %t )]. Then, since
Ci (x) -t Ci (y) holds for all i 2 N , RC with case ") is again applied for
t
t
xN RC
z or BWC with case 7) is applied for xRC
z.
1
t
t
Thus, in summary, for any t 2 T n ft g, xRC z or xN RC
z holds.
NR
3. From 1. and 2., xPC z holds. Finally, in any case, it is impossible to
WP
have zRC
x. Therefore, by transitivity, xPC# z.
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